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I. INTRODUCTION
M OST OF THE valuable, useful, and transferable technology in the
world lies in the hands of the industrialized or developed coun-
tries.' These developed countries form two major political-economic
groups. In the terminology of the United 'Nations, these two groups are
(1) the developed market-economy countries, or the so-called Group B
countries, and (2) the- socialist countries, or the so-called Group D
countries. In the Group D countries, technology, as a form of prop-
erty, is owned by the governments of those countries. The Group B
countries, however, possess the major share of the world's valuable
technology, and almost all of this technology is owned by private
companies, not by the governments of these countries." There is some
government-owned technology in the Group B countries, but virtually
all of this teclmology is untried, unproven, and unused. It tends to
1. See J. DE CUBAS, Technology Transfer and the Developing Nations, FUND FOt
MULTINATIONAL MANAcEMENT EDUCATION & COUNCIL OF TIlE A. waucas 6-7 (1974);
The Possibility and Feasibility of An International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/22 at 5-6 (1974); S. Patel, Transfer of Technology
and Developing Countries, 6 FOREIGN TRADE REVIEW at 387-90 (Jan.-Mar. 1972).
2. See note 1 supra. See also, Survey of Corporate Research & Development Spend-
ing: 1975, BUSINESS WEEK, June 28, 1976 at 62; McMullen & Carroll, New Research
Findings - The Lag in U.S. Research and Development, I NEw INTErNATioNAL
REAI.ITIFS 18 (Apr. 1976); Remarks of D. L. Guertin (Panel l)iscussiorn), 1976 Pno-
CEEDINGS OF THE Am. Soc. OF le's. L. at 237.
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constitute the fruits of basic research or research which has not yet
reached the stage of practical application which is characteristic of
applied research. In the Group B countries, the private companies
that own the practical technology must operate at a profit for their
shareholders on a long term basis. If these companies do not generate
a profit, they will eventually go bankrupt. Accordingly, a basic premise
in the management of private companies is that the company must
look forward to an acceptable return on investment (ROI). If manage-
ment cannot foresee an acceptable ROI from the projects that are
proposed to it, management will instead devote the company's energy
and resources to projects for which the ROI is more promising."
A basic difficulty or misunderstanding that has arisen between the
transnational enterprises ("transnationals") and the developing coun-
tries seems to stem from a failure on each side to understand the basic
premises underlying the philosophic and economic principles under
which the other side operates. The developing, or "Group of 77,"1
countries are naturally desirous of obtaining technology from the in-
dustrialized (Group B and Group D) countries under the most favor-
able possible circumstances. It is implicit that the primary mechanism
for effecting the bulk of this transfer is through the discretionary
activities of the transnationals.
One thesis that has been advanced is that once technology exists,
it has already been paid for, and, therefore, it costs virtually nothing
for the transnationals to transfer it to developing country enterprisesn
The experience of the transnationals, however, is that useful, practical
technology can be created only through the expenditure of tremendous
funds for research and development (R&D). Most R&D programs now
are incredibly expensive, and seldom rewarding, undertakings. For
3. See W. Chudson & T. Wells, The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational
Corporations by Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/12 at 3-10 (1974); De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs of U.N. Secretariat, Multinational Corporations
in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 at 38-45 (1974). See also The Break-
down of U.S. Innovation, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 16, 1976 at 56-68.
4. In United Nations terminology, the developing countries, sometimes referred to
as the "nonaligned countries," are denoted as the "Group of 77." It is believed this
shorthand terminology for the developing countries, within United Nations circles, was
first used in 1968 at a time when the total number of developing countries in the U.N.
did, in fact, constitute 77 countries. At this time the number of United Nations member
countries who are now included in the Group of 77 has risen to approximately 110
countries. This substantial augmentation'in the short space of eight years reflects a
rapid increase in the number of independent developing countries that has been taking
place.
5. See J. DE CUBAS, Technology Transfer and the Developing Nathns, FUND vou
MULTINATIONAL MANAGIEMIENT EDUCATION & COUNCIL OF TIlE AMERICAS 12 (1974).
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every successful piece of technology generated from R&D a hundred
other ideas are typically pursued which lead only to blind alleys."
Support of a successful R&D program thus requires not only a large
initial investment of capital, but also demands that the profits from
successful technology be plowed back into further R&D to generate
successful new techmology. It thus often appears that a high ROI is
being obtained by a transnational on a successful piece of technology.
But it is not clearly understood that a high ROI is needed to fund the
R&D to support the creation of successful new technology because at
the same time this ROI supports the hundreds of blind alleys which
are also pursued, and for which the ROI is zero. Thus, royalties on
successful technology are used to produce more successful technology
and to support the research on other ideas that never bear fruit, but
which may, nevertheless, require the investment of large sums before
researchers can establish that the ideas will be still-born.
Another difference in viewpoint between the developed and de-
veloping countries is that the industrialized countries and the trans-
nationals look upon successful technology as a commodity, whereas
the developing countries apparently look upon successful technology
as having a unique status that amounts to something other than, or
more than, a commodity. Realistically viewed, however, successful
technology is a commodity just like oil, coffee, wheat, tin, bauxite, or
any of thousands of other commodities., It has a value-and that value
can be measured in terms of a price. The transnationals, operating
under the profit incentive and depending in part on profits from tech-
nology sales to fund R&D programs, are thus extremely reluctant to
sell successful technology at a price that represents less than its real
value as a commodity. Accordingly, there is a conflict between the
methods pursued by the transnationals for generating technology,
which have been the most successful methods yet devised, and the
ideas of the developing countries on what should be done to promote
more efficient and less expensive transfer of technology. These are
points of disagreement which must be resolved in a way that not only
will not undermine and dry up the present technology transfer process,
but that will make it even more efficient, productive, and helpful than
it has been in the past.
6. See K. SAuvANT & F. LAviPoun, CornrOLmNC MULTINATIONAL ENTEKRPnISE :
PROBLiES, STRATEcms, CouN'rER STRATEGErS at 35-38 (1976) (reprint of Senate Finance
Committee Report entitled "Implications of Multinational Finns for NVorld Trade and
Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor").
7. The Possibility and Feasibility of An International Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/22, para. 17 at 5 (1974).
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The achievement of this objective will require mutual respect be-
tween the developed countries and the developing countries for one
another's problems. New initiatives must be explored for improving
transfer. One of these initiatives is the Pugwash Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology" submitted in the report of the Working Group
at a Pugwash conference held in Geneva, Switzerland in April 1974,
about which more will be said later. But a .code of conduct must not
be too rigid or inflexible, or it may have the reverse effect of what is
intended.
The single most critical operative premise of any approach to the
development of a code of conduct is that technology will be transferred
only when both the owner of the technology is willing to transfer it
and the transferee is willing to receive it. The starting point must,
therefore, be an appreciation of those concerns and interests of the
parties to a prospective transfer which are in conflict or competition,
whether real or imagined. The dialogue in recent years between spokes-
men for- the views of the transnationals based in the developed or
industrialized countries and spokesmen for the views of enterprises
situated in the developing countries has contributed immeasurably to
an understanding of the concerns and interests of these two important
groups of transferors and transferees of technology."
Although the need for technology transfer into the developing
countries has been recognized, incentives must exist for the owners
of tebhnology to engage and cooperate willingly in the transfer. The
broadest policy objectives of a code of .conduct should be conceived
with an appreciation of the legitimate concerns of enterprises located
in the developing countries, while preserving a climate ih which trans-
ferors will willingly and enthusiastically continue to participate in the
transfer process. This is especially true where any adopted code of
conduct may serve as the basis for compulsory national legislation in
a host developing country, rather than merely a format for guidelines
to technology transfer.10
8. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/L.12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pugwash Code].
'9. This dialogue has taken place in various private, governmental and international
forums. For a review of the various groups involved, see The Possibility and Feasibility
of An International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Do6. TI)/B/AC.
11/22 at 27-30 (1974).
10. The experiences of the members of the Andean Group under its Common Regime
of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties
(Decision No. 24, adopted Dec. 31, 1970 by the Commission of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, as amended), 11 I.L.M. 126 (1972), are instructive in this regard. Recent reports
indicate that several members of the Andean Group believe the restrictions on foreign
investment and technology transfer have damaged their economies beyond any tangible
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The criticisms of the developing country enterprises with respect
to technology transfer arrangements in the past have been voiced in
various forums. The proposed Pugwash Code of Conduct resulting from
the Geneva Pugwash Conference attempts to define clauses and prac-
tices which should be prohibited, and guarantees which should be
made, to ensure equity in the transfer of technology to the developing
countries. Similarly, the arguments of the transferors based in the
developed and industrialized countries have been presented. These
arguments stress the need for the absence of restraints to permit an
environment in which technology transfer can flourish in an atmosphere
of flexibility."1 Both postures have merit, yet both must be compro-
mised to reach an acceptable consensus. Owners of technology are
moved to enter into agreements for its transfer more by the promise
of a profitable ROI than by the opportunity to assist social improve-
ment i4. the developing countries. "1 2 Transferees are motivated to al-
locate capital resources in consideration for technology by the need
for such technology rather than by a desire to enhance the profit op-
portunities of technology owners.13 Within this broad framework of
differing objectives, the traditional pattern of contract negotiation in
private enterprise economies can operate. In the end, agreement and
cooperation will be achieved only if each party has realized its broad
objective. The extent to which the objective of a party is satisfied de-
pends upon its relative bargaining strength and flexibility.14 Any form
benefits that have been received from the common regime. Thus, several members are
agitating for a relaxation of restraints on foreign investment and technology transfer.
See Reversal of Policy: Latin America Opens the Door to Foreign Investment Again,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 9, 1976 at 34; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 1976 at 6,
col. 1. Chile has in fact withdrawn from the Andean Group because of the severity of
these restraints. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 1, 1976 at 1, col. 3. See generally 3
INvESTIc, LxcE sINc & TRADING CONDITONS ABROAD - LATIN AmIFwCA § 1.05 et
seq. (1976); Review of Legislative and Administrative Systems for the Regulation of
Technology Transfer Agreements, U.N. Doe. ID/WG.206/2 at 17 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Preparation of a Draft Outline of an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.1/3 at 25-33 (1975) (U.S. Govern-
ment comments on Pugwash Code); COUNCIL oF TnE AmmucAs AND FuND Fon MuLTI-
,iATONAL MANAG-E.MENT EDUCATON, Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology:
A Critique (1974) (analysis of Pugwash Code).
12. See M. Okano, Practical Remarks Concerning the Selection of Technology Includ-
ing Main Considerations of the Purchase of Intermediate Products, Components, etc. in
Licensing Agreements, U.N. Doc. ID/WG.178/4 at 5 (1974).
13. See Interregional Consultation on Exchange of Experience betteen Developing
Countries: Formulation and Application of the Mexican Law on Licensing and Patents
and Comparable Experience in Other Developing Countries, U.N. Doe. ID/WG.194/6 at
15-21 (1975).
14. See generally G. NImEENBaac, The Art of Negotiating (1968) especially chapters
2 & 11.
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of external restraint on the ability of each party to reach its goal neces-
sarily affects the relative bargaining postures of tlie parties. The desir-
ability of such external restraints in the area of technology transfer,
therefore, must be assessed by weighing the overall benefits to be
-gained by technology transfer against the impact of the restraints on
the ability of the negotiating parties to arrive at an acceptable agree-
ment to transfer technology. 15
It is suggested' that, as a general policy, any code of conduct for
technology transfer should be drafted with a view towards three ob-
jectives: (1) preserving an environment in which technology transfer
is potentially profitable for the transferor; (2) improving the bargain-
ing strength of a developing country enterprise by defining reasonable
external restraints to be placed on the transferor; and (3) retaining
sufficient flexibility for both the transferor and transferee to permit
negotiation in any given situation on an acceptable consensus which
is tailored to the needs of that situation.
Notwithstanding the protests of some representatives of the view-
point of the technology owners, technology transfer can be effected
profitably in an atmosphere of external restraint. Transferors are ac-
customed, for example, to entering into technology transfer agreements
within the constraints of the antitrust laws of the United States,10 the
European Economic Community 17 (EEC) and Japan.18 Indeed, many
of the objectives sought to be achieved by the developing country en-
terprises are the same as, or analogous to, those at which the antitrust
laws are aimed. While the transnationals may disagree with particular
prohibitions under those laws as interpreted, adaptation of licensing
practices can and has been made.
15. Otherwise, the diminution of technology flow resulting from such restraints may
impact adversely on economic development. See note 10 supra. See also Green, Emerging
Restrictions on Transfer of Technology, 15 IDEA 274, 275 (1971).
16. See SHERMAN ANTITRUST AcT, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1973); CLAYTON ANTITMUST
AcT, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1973); FEDERAL TRADE CommissioN Aar, 15 U.S.C. § 41
et seq. (1973). See also M. Finnegan, The Effect of United States and EEC Antitrust
Law on International Licensing and Licensing into Developing Countries, U.N. Doe.
ID/WG.131/4 (1972).
17. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) (Arts. 85 & 86). See generally Finnegan, The
Burgeoning Development of the Common Market Competition Rules and Its Impact
on International Licensing, 27 MERcER L. REv. 519 (1976); Fine, The Nature of A
Restrictive Practice Under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, Part Two, 5
J. LAw & EcoN. DEv. 201 (1971).
18. Antitrust impact on technology transfer agreements in Japan is provided by the
Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements promulgated by
the Fair Trade Commission on May 24, 1968 and reprinted in H. Iyont ANTIMONOPOLY
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The disincentive to engage in technology transfer which accom-
panies each restraint must be considered, however, and the aggregate
effect weighed. If the balance is tipped heavily against the transferor,
the beneficial effects of technology transfer may be subject to serious
risk. A particular restraint may be advantageous, but of insufficient
benefit to warrant jeopardy of technology transfer. In this context,
the fact that the restraint is embodied in antitrust laws of industrialized
countries may not be controlling, if the anticompetitive effects sought
to be avoided by those laws are of a different magnitude or quality
than the undesirable effects experienced by the transferees of tech-
nology in developing countries. For example, various types of exclusive
dealing arrangements which have been found to violate the antitrust
laws of the United States"9 and the EEC2 0 might, in the context of a
developing country enterprise, prove to be a necessary and desirable
means of obtaining access to international markets. 2
IL. THE PROPOSED CODES OF CONDUCT
ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
A. Background
The first and most widely publicized of the proposed drat codes
of conduct was submitted as a report of "The Working Group on Code
of Conduct on Transfer of Technology of the Pugwash Conferences
LEGISLATION IN JAPAN (1968). Subsection 1 of Section 6 of the Act concerning Prohibi-
tion of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Antimonopoly Act) prohibits
an entrepreneur from entering into an international agreement which could constitute
an unreasonable restraint of trade or an unfair business practice. The Guidelines are
concerned especially with restrictions which are liable to constitute unfair practices. The
Antimonopoly Act provides for post-notification of international agreements (Subsection
2 of Section 6) and measures providing for elimination of illegal agreements (Section
7). Not surprisingly, and in accord with the Japanese national character, there has been
no litigation instituted by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) under the Guidelines,
because whenever a provision has been determined to violate the Antinuonopoly Act,
or its implementation through the Guidelines, the parties were contacted by the FTC
and persuaded to modify or remove the offending provision. Before the Guideline came
into effect in 1968, illegal restrictions had typically been removed from agreements in
the process of screening them under the Foreign Investment Act. (Hereinafter, the
Japanese FTC Guidelines are cited as Japan, FTC Guidelines.]
19. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) striking
down exclusive supply contracts.
20. See, e.g., Re the Agreement of Kali and Salz A.G., 13 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D1
(1973) striking down contract between the only two German potash fertilizer producers
which required one to buy all of other producer's output.
21. Exclusive sales agreements may be the only viable way a developing country en-
terprise can market its products. The treatment of exclusive sales agreements by the
proposed codes of conduct is discussed in note 64 infra and accompanying text.
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on Science and World Affairs" at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland
conducted during April 1-5, 1974. This proposed code of conduct has
come to be known as the "Pugwash Code." It was published and cir-
culated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) on July 15, 1974 at the request of the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Algeria, made in his capacity as Chairman of the Group
of 77 at a session of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on Trans-
fer of Technology.22 A code of conduct on transfer of technology has
not yet been developed by UNCTAD itself. Efforts to draft such a
code were begun by an intergovernmental group of experts under the
auspices of UNCTAD in May of 1975. These efforts were continued
at a meeting of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Committee on Trans-
fer of Technology which was. held in Geneva from November 24
through December 5, 1975.
At the May 1975 UNCTAD meeting, the expert from Brazil sub-
mitted a revised draft outline for a code of conduct on behalf of the
Group of 77.23 The Group of 77 draft is, to a large extent, based on
the Pugwash draft. Although the mandate of the May 1975 meeting
was only to draft an outline of a proposed code of conduct, the Group
of 77 proposal- was a fully developed draft.2 4 In response to this initia-
tive by the Group of 77, the Group B countries developed still another
proposed outline of a draft code in Paris on October 27-29, 1975, under
the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. A refined version of this draft was submitted by the expert
from Japan on behalf of the experts from Group B as a "Revised Draft
Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology" at the UNCTAD Committee on Transfer of
Technology meeting in Geneva on November 24, 1975 -.25
At the UNCTAD IV Conference held in Nairobi in May 1976,
discussions on a code of conduct were overshadowed by intensive
deliberations on world commodity pricing, distribution, and allocation.
22. Pugivash Code, note 8 supra.
23. U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/14, Annex 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Group 77 Codo],
24. The Group B countries strongly protested this overstepping Qf the May 1975 mni-
date to draft an "outline." See Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on
a Code of Conduct on Transfir of Technology held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 5 to 16 May 1975, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/1 at 11-12 (1975); Report of the United
States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Inter-
governmental Group of Experts on a Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology,
Geneva, Switzerland, May 5 to 16, 1975, submitted to the Secretary of State by Delega-
tion Chairman Robert B. Allen, at 3-4 (unpublished State Department Document).
25. U.N. Doe. TD/BJC.6/14, Annex I (1975) [hereinafter cited as Group B Code].
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However, it was agreed that an intergovernmental group of experts
would be established within UNCTAD, open to the participation of
all member countries, to prepare a draft international code of conduct
for the transfer of technology.20 The group is to hold one meeting in
1976 and as many additional meetings as may be required in 1977 to
draft, and hopefully reach agreement on, a proposed code by the end
of 1977.27 The group of experts- is to be free to formulate draft pro-
visions ranging from mandatory to optional, 'ithout prejudice to the
final decision on the legal character of the code.28
As a part of the resolution adopted by the conference in Nairobi,
UNCTAD recommended that a United Nations conference under its
auspices be held by the end of 1977 and that the conference should
negotiate the draft elaborated by the group of experts and take all
decisions necessary for" the adoption of a final document embodying
the code, including the decision on its legal character..29 The United
States has agreed to participate in the meetings of the intergovermental
group of experts. The first meeting of the group of experts took place
in November 1976 at UNCTAD's headquarters in Geneva.
The heart of each of these three draft codes is the chapter on
restrictive business practices. The Pugwash Code enumerates 20 dif-
ferent clauses as restrictive business practices and identifies five clauses
which "shall not be utilized" in teclmology transfer agreements in-
volving the use of trademarks in Chapter II1.3 Chapter IV of the
Group 77 Code has doubled this list of clauses forbidden as restrictive
business practices.3' In contrast, the Group B Code denominates in
more general terms only eight categories of restrictive business prac-
26. UNCTAD Resolution 89 (XII), U.N. Doe. TD/RES/89(XII), para. 2 (1976).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. para. 3.
30. Pugwash Code, ch. IV, para. 4(i)-(xx) and ch. III, para. 5(i)-(v). While the text
of the code prohibits the use of all twenty-five clauses, certain exceptions are recognized
with regard to the five clauses involving the use of trademarks. Chapter III of the
Pugwash Code is entitled "Relatioris Between Suppliers and Recipients of Technology."
31. Group 77 Code, cb. IV, para. 4.2(i)-(xl). Chapter IV of the Group 77 Code, en-
titled "Restrictive Business Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions," includes a
general catch-all provision prohibiting any clauses or practices in the technology transfer
agreements which "directly or indirectly have or may have adverse effects on the na-
tional economy of the recipient country," Id. ch. IV, para. 4.1. It also provides for ex-
emptions to the prohibitions of Chapter IV when required by the public interest. Id.
ch. IV, para. 4.3. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Group 77 Code prohibits
restrictive business practices "whether part of written arrangements or not...." Id. ch.
IV, para. 4.2. Certain cartel activities are also treated in Chapter IV. See note 33 infra
and accompanying text.
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tices in Chapter V.32 Additionally, using almost identical language,
both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes provide that the following
horizontal cartel activities "shall not be utilized:" (1) import cartels;
(2) rebate cartels and other price fixing arrangements; (3) national
export cartels; (4) international cartels which allocate markets or
control exports or imports; (5) private and semi-official agreements on
certain standards in developing countries; and (6) specialization and
rationalization cartels.33
Significantly, both the Group 77 Code and 'the Pugwash Code
visualize that any code should be an internationally legally binding
instrument. As stated in the Pugwash Code:
The Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology should be the
object of a multilateral legal instrument to be internationally nego-
tiated and agreed upon, and to become binding on signatories once
the conditions for its entry into force, to be established in the legal
instrument itself, are fully met.
3'
Presumably, once sufficient informal support has been generated for
a code of conduct, an attempt will be made to convene a diplomatic
conference at which the terms of the proposed code will be hammered
into the format of an international treaty to be ratified by the countries
subscribing to the document drawn up by the diplomatic conference.
Such a mode of proceeding would be similar to that which was adopted,
for example, with the Patent Cooperation Treaty, to which the parti-
cipating governments subscribed at a diplomatic conference held in
Washington, D.C. in June 1970.35
32. Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(i)-(viii). Chapter V of the Group B Code Is
entitled "Restrictive Business Practices." It should also be noted that certain practices
and clauses identified as restrictive business practices by both the Pugwash and Group
77 Codes, e.g., package licensing, are treated in the Group B Code, but not as restrictive
business practices. Id. ch. IV, para. 4.1(i)-(v) (Chapter IV, "Responsibilities of Source
and Recipient Enterprises").
33. Pugwash Code, ch. IV, paras. 6 & 7; Group 77 Code, el. IV, para,-4.4. The Pug-
wash Code further lists cartels for the exchange of technical information and small-scale
industry and marketing cartels. Pugwash Code, ch. IV, para. 7(v). With respect to
these and the last three types of cartel activities enumerated in the text, the Pugwash
Code specifies that "Any adverse effects of [such] cartel activities on the transfer of
technology should be avoided." Id. ch. IV, para. 7. While apparently preserving the
precondition of adverse effect, the Group 77 Code employs the less equivocal phrase
"shall not be utilized" with respect to all the enumerated cartel activities. Group 77
Code, ch. IV, para. 4.4. While both Codes restrict the prohibition on horizontal cartel
activities to those involving the transfer of technology, the Group B countries are almost
certain to find the same logic applicable to horizontal cartel activities restricting access
to raw materials,' e.g., OPEC. See Preparation of a Draft Outline on an International
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doec. TD/B/C.6/AC.1/3 at 30 (1975)
(Comments of the United States Government on Pugwash Code).
34. Pugwash Code, cl. X, para. 15 entitled "Implementation and Revision."
35. - U.N.T.S. __ (1970).
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Not surprisingly, the Group B countries take the position that any
international code of conduct on technology transfer should be re-
stricted to mutually acceptable and voluntary guidelines, rather than a
legally binding code. 36 It is also interesting that the Group D countries
have stated their general support for the preparation of a code of con-
duct, but they feel that such a code should be optional and allow for
flexibility in the application of its provisions.37
B. Restrictive Business Practices in Technology Transfer Agreements"
The prohibition or requirement of certain clauses in a contract for
the transfer of technology, and particularly a license agreement, will
have a direct impact on the transfer process. Therefore this article
will discuss the economic impact of the restrictive business practices
portions of the proposed codes on international cooperation in the
transfer of technology. With the foregoing general observations in
mind, attention is directed to specific clauses which might be prohib-
ited, permitted, or required by a code of conduct. For convenience,
the Pugwash Code will be used as a base against which provisions for
any proposed code of conduct may be evaluated and considered. Ac-
cordingly, thu remainder of this paper concerns itself with certain
specific provisions taken from the Pugwash Code. Reference will be
made by footnotes to corresponding provisions in the Group 77 and
Group B Codes where such comparison may provide illumination or
contrast. Because the Pugwash Code will undoubtedly be the parent
of any proposed code put forward by the Group of 77 countries, and,
of course, will also influence any voluntary code proposed by the Group
B countries, this method of analysis seems appropriate. The quotations
to which comparative reference is made below have thus been taken
from the Pugwash Code. The practices and clauses discussed are those
which have been identified as restrictive business practices in the
Pugwash Code, and, accordingly, prohibited.
1. Tie-in Clauses.
Tie-in clauses are "clauses and/or practices restricting the sources
of supply of raw materials, spare parts, intermediate products and
36. Group B Code, ch. I, para. 1.2; Id. ch. VIII, para. 8-0.
37. U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/1, para. 15 at 7 (1975).
38. See generally Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in the Formulation of
a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/17, paras. 103-107 at 26 (1976); R Vernon,
Restrictive Business Practices, U.N Doc. TD/B/399 (197-).
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capital goods .... ."39 A clause which requires the licensee to acquire
raw materials, spare parts, intermediate products, or capital goods for
use with the licensed technology only from the licensor or its designee
generally should not be included in a licensing agreement. Such tie-in
of unprotected goods is usually illegal under the United States anti-
trust laws, 40 and has been criticized by representatives of developing
country enterprises. It is likely that transferors will be amenable to
such a prohibition in a code of conduct, if the prohibition is not totally
inflexible. The benefit to the developing countries would be substantial.
There may be instances in which a licensor can justifiably refuse
to guarantee the suitability or adequacy of the technology transferred,
unless the supplies or capital goods acquired meet specifications set
out in the agreement. The reasonableness of a licensor's justification
for a tie-in must be viewed in light of the technology, the necessity of
supplies or capital goods of particular specifications, and the avail-
ability of compatible supplies or capital goods from other sources.
An absolute prohibition against tie-ins without any qualifications,
as proposed in the Pugwash Code, might in some instances actually
hinder the transfer of technology. For example, to maintain quality
control it might be necessary for a transferor to insist that certain
materials, spare parts, or components used in the exploitation of the
technology be obtained from designated sources - at least for a limited
period of time. Although such restrictions might be justifiable in only
a very limited number of situations, such situations do exist and could
render the prohibition impractical as worded.41
39. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(ii). A footnote to this provision indicates that it
is to be read in conjunction with ch. V, para. 8(vil) which provides that where no other
sources exist, the prices of the materials shall be consonant with international price levels.
See note 85 infra and accompanying text. See also Andean Group's Decision No. 24,
11 I.L.M. 126, 133 (1972) Art. 20(a); Mexico's Law for the Registration of the Trans-
fer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trade-Marks, adopted
December 28, 1972, Article 7 (VI) [hereinafter cited as Mexican LaW], and reprinted
in U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/13 (1973); and Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article I, para. (4).
Both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes address tie-ins of trademarked products In
a separate provision. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 5(ii); Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para.
4.2(xvi). The only difference between the two codes in this regard is that the Pugwash
Code does not denominate such clauses as restrictive business practices, while the Group
77 Code does.
40. See e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
41.- The Group 77 Code contains a virtually identical provision. Group 77 Code, eh.
IV, para. 4.2(iii). The Group B Code identifies "tied sales" as a restrictive business
practice and defines the practice as coercing the licensee "[T]o accept unwanted and
unneeded licenses, or purchase unwanted and unneeded goods or services from the
licensor or his designated source." Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(tii). It should also
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2. Package Licensing.
Package licensing has been defined as "clauses and/or practices
requiring the acceptance of additional techmology not desired by the
recipient, as a condition for obtaining the techmology in question, and
requiring the remuneration for such additional technology, e.g. pack-
age licensing . "... 4 The prohibition against tying may be extended
to a requirement that the licensee accept additional, unnecessary, and
unwanted technology as a condition for the transfer of the desired
technology. It is the coercive or mandatory aspect of the arrangement
which should be avoided.
4 3
This prohibition should not prevent package licensing when the
elements of the package can be shown to be necessary, desirable, and
unavailable elsewhere. Thus, in some instances, a particular technology,
although not required for the desired technology to be complete, is
known by the licensor to be necessary or highly desirable for best
results.- In such a situation, the burden of showing the desirability of
accompanying technology should be on the licensor. If it is determined
that the same technology is not available loeally or from another source,
the licensee ca n decide whether the benefits of the accompanying
technology are indeed worth the additional cost.
The disaggregation or "unbundling" of packaged technology and
the consideration of each element of a package are not unreasonable
restraints on licensing. Such an approach permits the developing coun-
try enterprise to bargain for and ensure that it receives only that
technology which is necessary to achieve the desired result. Permitting
disaggregation may cause particular apprehension on the part of a
transnational desiring to have a signed contract before disclosing its
trade secrets or know-how. Furthermore, the transnationals may doubt
the ability of those in the developing countries to properly evaluate
the need for certain elements of the package to achieve the desired
result. These shortcomings of disaggregation should not adversely af-
fect the transfer of technology if the developing country enterprises
be noted that the Group 77 Code includes a separate prohibition of tie-ins with respect
to trademarked products. Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xvi). See alto, Id. ch. IV,
para. 4.2(xxi) concerning tying of imports to specific source for purpose of charging
higher than normal prices.
42. Pugwash Code, ch. M para. 4(iv).
43. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); American
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3rd. Cir. 1959) cert. denied,
361 U.S. 902 (1959).
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make a positive effort to assure the transferors that their technology
will be competently and confidentially evaluated.
44
3. Tie-out Clauses.
Tie-out clauses are "restrictions in obtaining competing or comple-
mentary technology through patents and know-how from other licen-
sors with regard to the sale or manufacture of competing products
... ."45 Clauses which restrict the transferee from obtaining competing
or complementary technology from other licensors or the public domain
should be prohibited. Such clauses are illegal "tie-out" provisions under
United States antitrust law.4c Tie-out clauses adversely affect the sense
of autonomy of developing country enterprises. Transferors of tech-
nology will understand the important interest in preserving the identity
and self-determination characteristics of developing country enter-
prises. In turn, the transferees should recognize the legitimacy of the
technology owners' desire to secure a good ROI and an adequate re-
ward for release of their property rights.
4. Price Fixing.
Price fixing involves "clauses and/or practices whereby the supplier
of technology reserves the right to fix the selling or resale price of the
products manufactured .... ."4 Transferors should be prohibited from
attempting to fix the price at which the licensee may sell or resell
licensed products or products made by using licensed technology. Al-
44. All three proposed codes apparently agree that disaggregation will have a salutary
effect on the transfer process. See Group B Code, ch. IV, para. 4.1 (iii); Group 77 Code,
ch. IV, para. 4.2(xx). See also Andean Group's Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133
(1972) Art. 19.
45. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(vi), The Group 77 Code contains an identical
provision in ch. IV, para. 4.2(ii). In addition, both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes
contain a similar pr6hibition on tie-outs with respect to products involving trademarks.
Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(x); Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 5(v). See also Andean Group's
Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133 (1972) Art. 20(d); Mexican Law, Article 7 (VIII);
and Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article I, para. (3). It is also to be noted that the Group
B and Group 77 Codes identify restrictions on the transferee's freedom to enter Into
sales or representation agreements. related to similar or competing technologies as a
restrictive business practice. Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(iv) (only unreasonable
restrictions); Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xii). See note 60 infra and accompanying
text.
46. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); National Lock-
washer Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943). The same Is true
under the EEC law. See A.O.I.P. v. Beyrard, 17 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D14 (1975).
47. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(viii). The Group 77 Code contains a similar pro-
vision, Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xiv), while the Group B Code fails altogether
to treat the issue of price fixing. See also Andean Group's Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M.
126, 133 (1972) Art. 20(b); Mexican Law, Article 7(XI); and Japan, FTC Guidelines,
Article I, para. (2).
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though the licensor may affect the sale price by the royalty rate it
sets, it should not attempt to fix the price. Such action has been held
to be illegal under the United States and EEC antitrust laws.48
5. Production Volume Restraints.
Production volume restraints are "clauses and/or practices restrict-
ing the recipients volume, scope and range of production or field of
activity .... 4." Clauses which restrict the volume of production of a
licensed process may be prohibited as outside the reasonable scope
of the property rights of the licensor in the licensed teclmology."
However, clauses which restrict the volume of the licensed product,
such as a patented product, should not be absolutely barred.51
Treating volume restriction clauses in any code of conduct requires
a careful balancing of factors. Any restraint on volume has a clear
limiting effect on the licensee's potential competitive posture in world
markets. Moreover, it comprises an indirect influence on the developing
country enterprise's self-guidance by the transnational licensor. These
are negative consequences of legitimate concern to the developing
country. However, the adversity of these restraints may be more illu-
sory than real. Even without production restraints, developing country
companies are not likely to be able to compete in international markets
as quickly or effectively as they desire. Moreover, the ability to barter
for more favorable terms in other negotiable aspects of the transfer
agreement should assuage any sense of infringement on autonomy im-
posed by production restraints. This is not to say that production
restraints should be permitted where, absent the restraint, a develop-
ing country enterprise would be able to effectively compete in interna-
tional markets. Rather, the suggestion is that, as a matter of bargaining
strategy, such restraints would be a significant "chip" in a developing
48. Although price fixing is still theoretically legal in the United States vhere a
manufacturing licensor licenses only one manufacturing licensee under a product patent
(United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926)), as a practical matter,
price fixing in license agreements in the United States is a thing of the past. The anti-
trust principles evolving in the EEC are similarly hostile to any attempt to fi prices.
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, note 17 supra, prohibits any direct or indirect attempt
to fix purchase or selling prices. See Re Deutsch Philips CmbH, 12 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
D241 (1973).
49. Pugvash Code, ch. III, para. 4(vii). See Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(i)
which is the same. See also Andean Group's Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133 (1972)
Art. 20(c); Mexican Law, Article 7(XI); and Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article I, para. (2).
50. Cf. American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Building Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.
1934).
51. Cf. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3rd Cir. 1959).
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country enterprise's hand. Obviously, an outright prohibition of these
restraints takes away that "chip."
Volume restrictions are usually included to preserve the competitive
positions of the licensor and his other licensees. Where the licensor
holds a product patent, the argument that it thereby has the legitimate
power to control competition in the licensed product has some force.
If each of the parties to a production license recognizes a reasonable
correlation between the scope of the transferor's property rights and
the restriction on production, the negotiating climate will be improved.
The developing country enterprise can still trade off any concession
respecting production in exchange for concessions on other negotiable
conditions of the agreement. The transnationals will appreciate that
their legitimate interests have been considered in the adoption or re-
jection of a prohibition on production restraints in the code of conduct.
Where the licensor's property rights reside in a process for making
a product, clauses which restrict product volume are far less defensible.
An ancillary right to control the product market cannot be reasonably
asserted because such a claim clearly exceeds the scope of the licensor's
property right. Not only does the basis for the transferor's justification
for the restriction weaken, but the adversity of the impact on the trans-
feree heightens. Thus, the interference with a developing country en-
terprise's autonomy becomes more serious as the relationship between
the restriction and the reasonable scope of the transferor's property
rights is more tenuous. Also, where the protected technology covers
manufacturing rather than the product itself, the transferees ability
to compete effectively in world markets with the acquired technology
may actually be impeded by product volume restrictions.
This treatment of volume restrictions illustrates the balancing ap-
proach to decision-making with respect to code of conduct provisions
which should be followed. This approach gives vent to the substantial
arguments on both sides and reaches a demonstrably fair and con-
sidered decision. In this case where the strengths of the arguments for
and against product volume restrictions are dependent upon whether
the protected technology is the product itself or only the process for
making the product, a more selective prohibition of production restric-
tions (i.e., where it is the process that is licensed) is a reasonable,
justifiable decision in drafting the code of conduct.
6. Export Restrictions.
Export restrictions include "clauses and/or practices prohibiting
or limiting in any way the export of products manufactured on the
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basis of the technology in question including restrictions on exports to
certain markets, permission to export only to certain markets; and re-
quirement of prior approval of the licensor for exports . . . clauses
and/or practices requiring higher technology payments on goods pro-
duced for exports vis-a-vis goods for the domestic market .... " The
code of conduct treatment of clauses which restrict export of the
products resulting from the licensed techmology should be based on
a balancing of factors similar to those weighed in connection with
volume restrictions.
Export restrictions should be prohibited where unreasonable. What
constitutes reasonableness with respect to any export restriction will
depend on the nature of the licensed technology, the licensor's rea-
sons for imposing the restriction, and the scope and duration of the
restriction.53 There can be sound reasons for export restrictions. For
example, a licensor will often have an exclusive licensee in each of
one or more territories, and may wish to protect one licensee's market
from competition by goods imported by another licensee. Developing
52. Pugwash Code, ch. I, para. 4(i) & (v). A footnote to the first clause addressing
export restrictions recognizes that in "certain appropriate circumstances export restrictions
might be justified." The Group B and Group 77 Codes likewise identify export restric-
tions as restrictive biusiness practices. The Group B Code, however, addresses only those
restrictions which "unreasonably prevent the export of unpatented products or com-
ponents, or which unreasonably restrict exports to countries where the product made
pursuant to the licensed technology is not patented." Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(i).
In contrast, the Group 77 Code contains outright prohibitions on any type of export
restrictions, recognizing no circumstance where such restrictions are permissible. Group
77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xi) & (xv). It does, however, permit differential rates of
payment for export output vis-a-vis domestic output where such rates are "in the interest
of the recipient country." Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxiii). It is interesting to note that this
is -one of the few instances where the Group 77 Code adopts a more flexible position
thanq the Pugwash Code which simply prohibits differential technology payments. Both
the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes also address export restrictions in the context of cartel
activities among technology suppliers. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. See
also Andean Group's Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133-35 (1972) Arts. 20 and 25(a)
and Mexican Law, Article 7(VII). The Japanese FTC Guidelines quite sensibly provide
that, although it will be considered an unfair business practice for a licensor to restrict
the area to which his licensee may export licensed products, there are three exceptions
under which an export restriction will not be considered an unfair business practice.
These are: (1) where the licensor has patent rights in a territory to which the licensee
is restricted from exporting; (2) where the licensor is already selling licensed product
in the restricted area under his normal business practice; and (3) where the licensor
has already granted an exclusive license to a third party to sell in the restricted area.
Japan, FTC Guidelines, Art. I, para. (1).
53. Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9tfl Cir. 1954); United
States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. I1. 1956); United States v.
Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945). See also Consten and
Grundig-Verkaus-GmbH v. EEC Commission, CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 7618 (1968) (Ex-
port Restrictions under Treaty of Rome). Cf. A.O.I.P. v. Beyrard, 17 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
D14 (1975); Re Kabelmetal's Agreement, 16 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D40 (1975). -
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country licensees frequently prefer exclusive licenses for their terri-
tories because of the limited host country market which often exists."'
Thus, the absolute prohibition of export restrictions can be detrimental
to all concerned under certain circumstances.
However, the recipient usually hopes to be able to export eventu-
ally. A restriction on export should therefore be limited in scope and
duration to that which is reasonable. A break-in period during which
the licensor can establish its position in its own market, or during which
other licensees can develop strength in their home territories, is a
reasonable time. The length of the break-in period will depend upon
the relative complexity of the technology.
Transnationals are accustomed to the availability of territorial re-
strictions reasonable in scope and duration under the antitrust laws
of the United States.5" An inflexible prohibition of such restrictions
would be difficult for technology owners to accept, and should be
considered too severe an external restraint on the transfer negotiation
process. It would be sufficiently protective of the developing country
interests to prohibit only export restrictions which are clearly unjusti-
fiable or unreasonable.
Export restrictions, no matter how reasonable, can only be imposed
on the licensee. It is outside the scope of property rights in the tech-
nology for a licensor to attempt to restrict a customer of the licensee.
Clauses which purport to do so can be prohibited. 0 A clause which
requires higher royalty payments for items produced for "export than
for domestic items is a form of export restriction which should be
treated in the same manner as other export restrictions.
7. Field of Use Restrictions.
Field of use restrictions are "clauses and/or practices restricting
54. The problem of limited domestic markets in developing countries and the impetus
that provides for protection of local industries is explored in the Latin American context
in The Process of Industrialization in Latin America, INTEn-ANIEIUCAN DI;VELOPMENT
BANK at 77-90 (1969). See generally R. PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT -
LATIN AMERcA's GREAT TAsK at 236-39 (1971); C. FURTADO, EcoNoislc DEVELOIPMENT
OF LATIN AMERICA - A SURVEY FROm COLONIAL TIMES TO 'IE CUBAN REVOLUTION [It
197-204 (1970).
55. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967); Shin
Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Industries, Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
56. See Adams v. Burks, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 453 (1873); Hensley Equipment Co.
v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52
(1973); Consten and Grundig-Verkaus-GmbH v. EEC Comm'n., CCHI Comm, Mkt. Rep.
7618 (1966); Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Crossniirkt CmbH 10 Comm, Mkt.
L.R. 631 (1971). The latter two cases were decided under EEC antitrust law.
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the recipients volume, scope and range of production or field of ac-
tivity....-57 Much of the technological property available from trans-
nationals can be used hi diverse fields of activity or to produce diverse
products. Under principles of U.S. antitrust law, it is not unreasonable
to permit the licensor of multifaceted technology to license various
uses of the technology separately n8
To require the licensor to license the technology without any re-
strictions on use could force the licensor to charge higher royalties to
the licensee, even though the licensee desires only a limited use of the
technology. Reasonable field of use restrictions are deemed legal under
the U.S. antitrust laws, so long as such restrictions are not used as a sub-
terfuge to divide markets or allocate customers between competitors. 59
8. Unilateral Grant-Back Provisions.
Unilateral grant-back provisions establish "a unilateral flow of tech-
nical information and improvements from the technology recipient
without reciprocal obligations from the technology supplier. All new
technologies, patents and improvements developed by the technology
recipient as a result of the agreement shall be the property of the
technology recipient .... -60 An inflexible prohibition against any uni-
lateral grant-back provision should not be incorporated into a code
of conduct. However, in recognition of the transferee's rights ind self-
generated improvement technology, a mandatory requirement for a
grant-back of title or an exclusive license should not be included in
transfer agreements. A grant-back of a non-exclusive licerise permitting
the licensor to use improvement technology developed by the licensee,
57. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(vii). See Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(1)
which is the same. The Group 77 Code contains a second and somewhat redundant
provision prohibiting field of use restrictions. Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxxvi).
58. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938),
aff'g, 304 U.S. 175 (1938). The Japanese Guidelines explicitly condone field of use
restrictions as being proper. Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article III, paras. (1), (2), and (3).
59. Id.
60. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(xi). The Group B Code takes the position that
an exclusive grant-back, where the effect of the same is "to abuse a dominant position
of the licensor," is a restrictive business practice. Group B Code, cli. V, para. 5.1(viii).
The Group 77 takes a slightly more lenient position than the Pugwash Code. It prohibits
exclusive grant-backs unless there is a reciprocal obligation on the technology supplier.
Group 77 Code, -ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxvii). See also Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxx) whirl
prohibits compelling recipient to obtain improvements from supplier and pant. 4.2(xxxi)
which prohibits limitation on recipients access to improvements. See also Andean Group's
Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133 (Art. 20(f)); Mexican Law, Article 7(IV); and
Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article I, par. (7).
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whether or not royalty-bearing should not be prohibited, even absent
a reciprocal grant-back provision running to the transferee.01
The licensor has a legitimate interest in improvements of its own
technology. Where the technology owner is without assurance that
improvements spawned through the transfer will. be available to it at
least on a nonex61usive basis, the transfer itself would be discouraged.
Moreover, the grant-back of a nonexclusive license is not an undue
imposition on the interests of the developing country enterprises. Such
provisions could frequently lead to royalty income for the transferee.
In addition, a grant-back constitutes a reasonable concession by which
the transferee may be able to secure more favorable terms under other
provisions of the agreement during the negotiation process.
The transferor should additionally not be prevented from acquiring
through a grant-back a nonexclusive license which includes the right
to sublicense. Such a clause may serve to reassure the licensor, and
enable the transferee to reduce royalties or secure other terms more
favorable than it could otherwise negotiate. By licensing improvements
to the transferor, the developing country enterprise may be able to
reach a greater share of the world market for the particular technology
and receive a greater return on its imiprovements.
9. Limitations On Transferee
with Respect to Research and Development.
These clauses involve "limitations on the research and development
(R&D) policy and activities of the recipient company.... ,,02 License
agreements should not include limitations on the policy or activities
61. In Transparent-Wrap Mach. "Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947)
(5-4 decision), it was held that an assignment grant-back was not a per sc antitrust vio-
lation and could be legal under the Rule of Reason. But the U.S. Department of Justice
currently views as unlawful any grant-back provision other than a non-exclusive license.
See also Re Kebehnetal's Agreement, 16 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D40 (1975); Raymond-
Nagoya, CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 9513 (1973). Both of these cases uphold nonexclusive
grant-backs under EEC antitrust law.
62. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(x). The Group 77 Code includes a similar pro-
vision, Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxvi), as well as a provision prohibiting
restrictions on the recipients ability to adapt the imported technology to local "appro-
priate circumstances." Id. The Group B and Group 77 Codes contain similar provisions.
Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(vii) (only when unjustifiable); .Group 77 Code, ch.
IV, para. 4.2(xii) (giving due regard to subcontracting arrangements). Similarly, tho
Group B and Group 77 Codes identify restrictions on the technology rcciplent's freedom
to enter into sales or representation agreements regarding similar or competing tcch-
nologies as a restrictive business practice. The Pugwash conditions. Id. ch. IV, para.
4.2(xxxii). See also Mexican Law, Article 7(V). The Group B Code takes a conciliatory
posture in urging source enterprises to "[eo-operate to the extent practicable and ap-
propriate, in the development of the scientific and technological resources of recipient
enterprises .... Group B Code, ch. IV, para. 4.1(iv).
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of the developing country licensee with respect to R&D. Such a re-
striction is outside the scope of the transferor's rights and unduly in-
terferes with the transferee's autonomous conduct of its own affairs.
Developing country enterprises should not be prevented from achieving
competitive technologies through their own independent efforts.
In prohibiting such activities by a licensor, however, the provision
should not be drafted so broadly as to condemn any clause which
might arguably have the indirect effect of limiting the transferee's
research activity under some strained or extended construction of the
terms of the provision. For example, as indicated above, nonexclusive
grant-back provisions should be permitted under certain circumstances.
A loosely worded policy statement could give rise to the contention
that any grant-back provision constitutes a "limitation" on developing
country research activity. A prohibition in any code of conduct should
address clauses which purport to directly affect the R&D policy and
activities of the transferee which are not ancillary to the rights of the
technology owner. This is a reasonably specific and justifiable restraint
on the transfer negotiation process.
10. Quality Control Clauses.
Quality control clauses are "clauses and/or practices using quality
controls or product standards by the supplier as a means of introduc-
ing unwarranted requirements on the technology recipients .... "Ya
Quality control and product standards may be very important for
technology which is closely tied to the reputation of the licensor, such
as when an associated trademark or service mark is also licensed, or
when a poor quality product might be injurious to health. In such
instances the imposition of quality control inspections or rigid product
standards through clauses in the license agreement can be justified.
Clauses imposing such requirements which are not reasonably neces-
sary should be excluded from transfer agreements. The Pugwash Code
apparently recognizes this distinction by prohibiting such clauses only
where they are used to impose "unwarranted requirements" on the
technology recipient.
11. Exclusive Sales or Representation Agreements.
Exclusive sales or representation agreements are "clauses and/or
practices requiring the recipient of techmology to enter into exclusive
sales or representation agreements with the supplier of technology
63. Pugwash Code, ch. IV, para. 4(iii). The Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(iv)
is the same.
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... ." 64 Clauses under which the licensee agrees to enter into exclusive
sales or representation agreements with the licensor should not be pro-
hibited without exception. For example, where the protected technol-
ogy resides in a product which requires continuous monitoring and
servicing in the hands of the consumer, such as automobiles, exclusive
representation agreements with the licensor may be desirable and ad-
vantageous. However, where such clauses are imposed involuntarily
on the transferee as a condition of the technology transfer, they are
properly prohibited. If the licensee voluntarily agrees to enter into
such exclusive arrangement, the clause should be permitted.
12. Royalty Payments in Form Other than Currency.
Royalty payments in form other than currency are "clauses and/or
practices obliging the recipient to convert technology payments into
capital stock... ."" Clauses in licensing agreements which require the
payment pf royalties in a form other than currency, for example, stock
in the licensee, should not be prohibited unless the form of payment is
involuntarily imposed upon the licensee or is contrary to the policies
of the host country. If the transferee is coerced to convert payments
into stock as a condition for license, the clause should be prohibited.
In such a case, it becomes essentially the type of tie-in that is almost
universally regarded as illegal.06
13. Clauses Requiring Licensor Participation in Management.
The clauses are "requirements by the supplier in licensing arrange-
ments, except management contracts, to participate in themanagement
decisions of the recipient enterprise ... [or] requirements to use the
staff designated by the technology supplier .... ."07 Involuntarily im-
posed clauses which require licensor participation in licensee manage-
ment or management decisions, or which mandate the use of staff
designated by the licensor, should not be included in agreements.
64. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(ix). The Pugwash Code does, however, note
that such agreements might be justified in some circumstances but the Group 77 Code is
silent on this matter. Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(iv) (unreasonable restrictions
only); Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xii). See also Mexican Law, Article 7(IX) &
(XII), and Japan, FTC Guidelines, Article I, para. (5).
65. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(xii). See Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xvill)
which is the same. The Andean Group's Decision No. 24 11 I.L.M. 126, 134 (1972)
Art. 21, contains a similar provision.
66. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
67. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(xiii) & (xiv). See Group 77 Code, ci. IV, para,
4.2(xxix) & (xxviii) (parallel provisions). See also Mexican Law, Article 7 (III) & (X).
The Group 77 Code also includes a provision prohibiting restrictions on or requiring
prior approval by the technology supplier of the recipient's publicity or advertisement
policies. Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(xvii).
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However, the licensor may justifiably refuse to guarantee production
levels or other aspects of the license agreement unless it is permitted
to participate to some extent in key decision-making processes of the
licensee. 68
14. Attempts to Exact Royalties in the Absence of
Valid Property Rights.
These clauses include "licensee's undertaking not to contest the
validity of the supplier's patents... restricting the use of the subject
matter of a patent and any unpatente-d know-how license which re-
lates to the working of the patent once the patent has expired... the
charging of royalties on patents after their expiry... ."00 Attempts to
insure continuation of the license even though the property rights no
longer exist are not justifiable. Such clauses are unenforceable under
United States law.7° Thus, a license agreement should not include
clauseg which prohibit the developing country licensee from challeng-
ing the validity of the licensor's property rights or which require pay-
ments to continue after the property rights have expired or been
extinguished. Clauses by which the licensee agrees not to challenge
the validity of the licensor's patents should be prohibited.-I Payments
extending beyond the life of the patent or after technical trade secrets
or know-how have entered the public domain, other than through
breach of a confidentiality agreement by the licensee, should likewise
be barred.
68. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
69. Fugwash Code, cl. III, para. 4(xviii), (xix) & (xx).
70. To require payment of royalties on use of a patented invention after the
patent has expired is per se unlawful in the United States. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 3i9
U.S. 29 (1964). The EEC Commission has taken the same view under Art. 85 of the
Treaty of Rome. See A.O.I.P. v. Beyrard, 17 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D14 (1975). All three
codes are in complete agreement that royalty payments on expired patents should be
barred. Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(v); Group 77 Code, ch. IV, par. 4.2(xxxviii).
The Group B Code is in accord with the Pugwash Code in also barring any restrictions
on the exploitation of a licensed product or process after the expiry of the patent, Group
B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(v), while the Group 77 Code, somewhat surprisingly, makes
no specific mention of this practice. It does, however, contain an additional provision
which prohibits the royalty payments on patents and other industrial property rights
not registered in the recipients country. Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxxvii).
71. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See also American Sterilizer Co.
v. Sybron Corp., 526 F.2d 542 (3rd Cir. 1975); Re Kabclmetal's Agreement, 16 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. D40 (1975); Davidson Rubber, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D52. The last two
cases hold that non-attack clauses are prohibited under EEC antitrust law. The Group
77 Code treats non-attack or no-contest clauses in the same manner as the Pugwash
Code. Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxxiv). In contrast, the Group B Code prohibits
only "unreasonable" restrictions prohibiting the licensee from challenging the validity of
a patent, and further provides that the licensor may terminate the license when the
patent is challenged by the licensee. Group B Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(vi).
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15. Restrictions On Use After Expiration of the Agreement.
These clauses concern "requirements that the recipient pay royal-
ties during the entire duration of manufacture of a product or tfi*6
application of the process involved and, therefore, without any speci-
fication of time ... clauses and/or practices prohibiting or restricting
" *the'use of the technology after the termination or expiry of the contract
in question....7 2 It has been suggested that clauses which restrict the
use of transferred technology after the expiration of the transfer agree-
ment should be prohibited. This would not be an advisable code pro-
vision. A distinction must be drawn between restraints on use or
royalty, payments after expiration of property rights and similar re-
straints after expiration of the agreement. In the absence of valid
property rights, the transferor has no legitimate claim to royalties or
control on use. In the absence of an agreement, however, it is the
transferee which lacks a right to use technology protected by valid
ptoperty rights. Clauses which restrict use of unexpired property rights
after agreement expiration are therefore proper.-,
It is understandable that a develbping country recipient of tech-
nology would want to be assured, once it undertakes production using
the licensed teclmology, that it will not be required to cease produc-
tion while the technology continues to have commercial feasibility.
However, this is a consideration which should be resolved by proper
planning and negotiation of the terms of the agreement. Where the
agreements involve the transfer of valuable trade secrets or know-how,
a clause restricting the licensee's disclosures of the secret information
after the expiration of the agreement is a valid exercise of the trans-
feror's property rights. When a licensor transfers technology in the
form of trade secrets and know-how, it must be assumed that the
technology will be held in strict confidence by the licensee.7
4
72. Pugwash Code, ch. III, para. 4(xv) & (xvi). The Group B Code does not contain
any comparable provisions. The Group 77 Code includes two parallel provisions, Group
77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(vi) & (vii) as well as a third rather vague provision prohibit-
ing contractual agreements of "unduly long duration." Id. ch. IV, para. 4.2(xxxv),
73. The right of a trade secret owner to protect his trade secrets against their un-
authorized use by one to whom they had been disclosed in confidence was recently
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bleron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974). See Re Kabelmetal's Agreement, 16 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 40 (1975)
which reached the same result under EEC antitrust law.
74. The Group B Code identifies the preservation of the confidentiality and proprie-
tary nature of trade secrets, know-how and all other secret information acquired in the
transfer process as a responsibility of both source and recipient enterprises. Group B
Code, ch. IV, para. 4.3(v) & (vi). See Re Kabelmetal's Agreement, 16 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. D40 (1975); Burroughs/Celia 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D72 (1971); Burroughs/Del-
planque 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D67 (1971); suninarized, I CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep.
2412.18.
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Normally, the agreement will endure for the predicted commercial
life of the technology. Indeed, it is in the interest of both the trans-
feree and transferor to fix the period of the agreement to correspond
to the expected commercial life of the technology. A clause providing
for renegotiation of the agreement after a certain period of time may
help to provide some assurances of the transferee's continued ability
to use the technology if the commercial life should prove longer than
originally expected.
16. Unused Technology.
Unused technology clauses require "continuation of payments for
unused or unexploited technology . ."; The licensee should not
be coerced into accepting a license for technology which it cannot
use. This principle is directly analogous to the objection to mandatory
package licensing, previously discussed.7 However, if a licensee has
demanded, bargained for, and received technology which it later
discovers it cannot use, a royalty schedule which is based to some
extent on the unused technology should not be considered per se
unreasonable. 77 The proper selection of royalty base can minimize the
problem of payments for unused technology. Developing country en-
terprises should seek a basis for running royalty payments which will
produce royalty figures that bear a direct relation to their actual extent
of use of technology. The license agreement could also include a pro-
vision for renegotiation should it become apparent to the parties that,
contrary to their original expectations, some portion or field of the
technology transferred cannot be used by the licensee.
C. Guarantees
Both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes include separate chapters
on guarantees.78 A minor exception notwithstanding," the Group B
75. Pugvash Code, ch. III, para. 4(xvii). See Group 77 Code, ch. IV, para. 4.2(xix).
See also Andean Group's Decision No. 24, 11 I.L.M. 126, 133-35 (1972) Arts. 20(g)
& 25(d).
76. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
77. Under U.S. law, a licensor cannot condition the granting of a license on the
licensee's agreeing to pay royalties on total sales of a class of products where all the
products of the class are not covered by the transferred technology, unless the licensee
voluntarily agrees to such an arrangement for converience of bookkeeping and account-
ing or the like. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969);
accord, Davidson Rubber, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D52.
78. Pugwash Code, Ch. V; Group 77 Code, ch. V.
79. This exception provides that source enterprises shall guarantee: "(a) [Tihe
technology meets the description contained in the technology transfer agreement; (b)
the technology, properly used, is suitable for the use specifically set forth in the tech-
nology transfer agreement." Group B Code, ch. IV, para. 4.1(vi).
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Code fails entirely to address the matter of guarantees. The Pugwash
Code lists nine guarantees which the supplier of technology is required
to make, and five guarantees which the recipient of technology must
make. The Group 77 Code contains a slightly different list of guaran-
tees for both suppliers and recipients of technology, omitting one of
the recipient's guarantees contained in the Pugwash Code. 0 Moreover,
the 'Group 77 Code goes on to list eight optional guarantees, evidently
to be imposed on both parties to a transfer agreement, which may be
required by the governments of technology-receiving countries.81 The
following discussion will focus on several of the more important guar-
antees in terms of impact on the technology transfer process, required
by the Pugwash Code.
1. Guarantees of Suitability.
The Pugwash Code has several provisions addressing guarantees
of suitability:
[T]he technology acquired is in itself suitable for the manufacture
of products covered by the agreement; the content of the tech-
nology transferred is in itself full and complete for the purposes of
the agreement; the technology obtained will in itself be capable of
achieving a predetermined level of production under the conditions
specified in the agreement..8 [T]he acquired technology will
be used as specified in the contract .... 3
The licensor should reasonably be required to guarantee that the
transferred technology is suitable for the purposes intended under
the agreement, if the technology is used in accordance with conditions
specified in the agreement. For such a guarantee to be meaningful,
the agreement should specifically define the intended products or goals
of the agreement, as well as conditions necessary to achieve them. This
80. The recipient guarantee omitted from the Croup 77 Code would require the
recipient to guarantee that the socio-economic conditions and needs of the recipient
country have been taken into account in the transfer agreement. Pugwash Code, ch. V,
para. 9(v). It should be noted, however, that this omission in the Group 77 Code may
not be very significant in view of the fact that several related guarantee obligations may
be imposed on both parties to the transfer agreement at the option of the government
of a recipient country under the terms of the Group 77 Code's chapter on guarantees
adverted to in the text. Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.3. The Pugwash Code does not
contain any optional guarantee provisions.
81. Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.3.
82. Pugwash Code, ch. V, para. 8(i), (ii) & (iii). See Group 77 Code, ch. V, para.
5.1(i), (ii) & (iii) which is the same. See also Group It Code, note 79 supra and
accompanying text.
83. Pugwash Code, ch. V, para. 9(i). See Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.2(1). It
should be apparent that this last guarantee is to be made by the technology, recipient,
while the first three guarantees, note 79 supra, are to be made by the technology supplier,
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would include specifications for particular raw materials if appropriate.
Requirements for success should not be a sham, however, and the
transferor should establish a sound basis for concluding that a given
condition is essential to the realization of the desired results.
In general, the licensor should not be expected to warrant the
suitability of technology without some assurance that the licensee will
use it properly. A code of conduct should be sufficiently flexible in its
prohibitions of clauses to allow the parties to include clauses which
may appear to be restrictive in return for a valuable guarantee. Clauses
guaranteeing that the transferred technology is complete, or that a
predetermined level of production can be achieved, stand in the same
posture as a guarantee of suitability. A licensee should be willing to
tolerate, at least to some extent, the stipulation of specific conditions
of production or use which are reasonably related to the achievement
of the desired results in return for either type of guarantee. A code
of conduct must be flexible enough to allow the parties to decide for
themselves wherein lies the most suitable trade-off of clauses, yet
definitive enough to provide the transferee with leverage to permit it
to participate significantly in reaching that decision.
2. Guarantee to Train Recipient Country Personnel.
This type of guarantee requires "national personnel shall be ade-.
quately trained in the operation of the teclmology to -be acquired and
in the management of the enterprises .. . . "84 A code may contain a
provision requiring a clause under which the licensor agrees to train
management and labor in the proper use of the transferred technology.
Such a provision is generally acceptable to the licensor as a means of
insuring the success and profitability of the license.
Difficulties arise where the guarantee is to train such personnel
adequately. A licensor cannot reasonably be expected to warrant the
quality, motivation, and learning ability of trainees over whom it has
no direct control. It is fair to require a licensor to provide adequate
training capacity. For the licensor to do less would be counterproduc-
tive to its own interests. However, the ultimate responsibility for pro-
viding qualified trainees should be on the licensee and the recipient
country.
Unfortunately, the determination of whether the licensor has pro-
vided the capability to train recipient country personnel and whether
the licensee has provided qualified trainees is so largely subjective,
84. Pugwash Code, ch. V, para. 8(iv). See Croup 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(iv)
which is the same.
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that attempts to enforce a training guarantee can lead to undesirable
disputes not easily resolved. Disagreements over the quality of the
training provided the personnel could threaten the harmonious rela-
tionship between the transferor and transferee and should be avoided.
3. Guarantee of Comparable Prices.
These guarantees require the prices of the articles be consonant
with current international price levels "where the recipient of the
technology has no other technological alternative than acquiring capi-
tal goods, intermediate inputs and/or raw materials from, or selling
his output to, the technology supplier or any source designated by
him . ... "85 If it is necessary for the licensee to acquire materials or
capital goods from the licensor or its designee, a requirement that the
licensor guarantee that the prices of such materials or capital goods
will be comparable to the international market price is entirely reason-
able. Problems may arise where no comparable international market
price exists for a particular item, as is frequently the case with inter-
mediate inputs, e.g., the frame for an automobile. This problem could
be overcome by establishing a standard accounting practice which
specifies a formula for pricing such items.
4. Licensor-Originated Improvements.
These guarantees provide "the recipient shall be informed and
supplied with all improvements on the techniques in question during
the lifetime of the agreement .... 80 Generally, a requirement that the
licensee be supplied with all licensor-originated improvements to the
licensed technology for the term of the agreement will not be accept-
able to the licensor. However, the licensee should be informed of the
improvements and be offered the opportunity to acquire a license to
them on reasonable terms.
Improvements to technology are expensive to develop and have the
effect of extending the market life of the technology. Unlike licensee-
originated improvements derived from the use of the licensed tech-
nology,7 the licensee has no particular claim of interest in licensor-
originated improvements. The imposition of such a clause could require
the licensor to contract away an unknown improvement which might
85. Pugwash Code, ch. V, para. 8(vii). See Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(vi)
which is the same.
86. Pugwash" Code, ch. V, para. 8(vi). The Group 77 Code adopts a more flexible
posture in its parallel provision. It merely requires a guarantee of "access" to all improve-
ments. Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(v).
87. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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well be worth more than the original technology. Such a result would
be unreasonable and could jeopardize transfer agreements. For ex-
ample, if a licensor transferred technology for making rayon synthetic
fibers and then later discovered and developed the technology for
making nylon, it would be unreasonable to require the licensor to
turn over the new nylon technology to the licensee without additional
consideration.
5. Spare Parts at No Further Cost.
This type of guarantee provides "for certain period of time the
supplier shall guarantee to provide spare parts, components, and servic-
ing of the technology without additional charges... .,,s A clause re-
quiring the licensor to supply, without additional charge, all necessary
spare parts, components and servicing for a specified period of time
inay be difficult to enforce in practice. That is, the licensee may pay
for the guarantee by being unable to persuade the licensor to agree
to a lower royalty rate than would be attainable without the guarantee.
The licensee may be better off to negotiate an individually-priced
guarantee of spare parts, components and servicing, and thus preclude
an unearned windfall for the licensor should the licensor's necessarily
speculative prediction of parts and servicing cost be higher than the
actual cost. A code of conduct requirement for such a no-additional-
cost guarantee may therefore have the effect of introducing inflexibility
into the negotiations rather than improving the transferee's bargaining
posture.
6. "Most Favored Licensee" Clauses.
"[A]l transfer of technology arrangements should include a pro-
vision by which if licensor grants more favorable terms to a second
licensee these terms will be automatically extended to the first li-
censee ... ."89 A most favored licensee clause should not be required
by a cod of conduct. Such clauses could frustrate many technology
transfer negotiations and cause considerable difficulty in the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of agreements in which the clause has been
included.
88. Pugwash Code, ch. V, para. 8(viii). See Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.1(viii) °
which is the same.
89. Pugwash Code, cl. V, para. 8(ix). The Group 77 Code's most favored licensee
guarantee differs from that of the Pugwash Code in two significant ways. First, it is
included in the list of optional guarantees which may be required by governments of
technology-receiving countries. Moreover, it requires most favored licensee treatment
to be extended only to "subsequent recipients in similar positions within the same
,Country." Group 77 Code, ch. V, para. 5.3(iv).
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A major problem is the correct valuation of the license. To deter-
mine whether a subsequent licensee has obtained more favorable terms,
the two licenses must be compared with respect to the value of the
technology licensed, the variety of methods of compensation used in
each license, and the value or detriment of the restrictions placed on
the licensee and licensor in each license. It is extremely difficult to
compare the value of two licenses if the technology is not precisely
the same in both licenses. This is frequently the case with respect to
transfers where the transferred technology is individually tailored for
each recipient enterprise. 0 For example, where only a patent is li-
censed to one recipient and another receives a license for the same
patent with know-how, trade secrets, or management assistance, a
comparison of the values of the respective licenses is an uncertain
effort. If a later license transferring more technology than an earlier
license contains a most favored licensee clause, the later licensee might
expect the same royalty rate as the earlier licensee, despite the fact
that the later licensee receives more technology. Such a situation
would be unacceptable to the licensor.
Many licenses have more than one form of payment. One license
may have only a royalty provision, while a second license may have
a lower royalty due to inclusion of a grant-back clause or exclusion of
certain guarantees. The value of the inclusion or exclusion of various
clauses is speculative, making a comparison based strictly on royalty
rate unfair and inequitable. In addition, where one license incorporates
restrictions on the licensee's exports or use of the technology on ter-
mination of the agreement, it cannot be compared with another license
which does not include those restrictions. Each clause in a license has
some value to each of the parties. This value depends on all the other
clauses, on the priorities of the parties, and on the possible benefits or
detriments each clause offers to each party. There is no way to compare
such inchoate, speculative values fairly.
The most favored licensee clause also presents a special problem
arising out of the national regulations of many developing countries.
Some countries have established a relatively low maximum royalty
rate. In those countries, the licensor may be able to license at that
90. Despite the protestations of the developing countries that the technology they
receive from the developed countries is ill-suited to their needs, i.e., too capital intensive,
developed country transferors frequently must make significant modifications to their
technology when it is destined for use in a developing country. Moreover, certain kinds
of technology are inherently capital intensive, e.g., telecommunications. The "appro-
priateness" of the technology transferred to developing countries is explored in W.
CHuDSON & L. WEnLs, The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corporations
by Developing Countries, U.N. Doec. ST/ESA/12 at 3-22 (1974).
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mandatory rate by receiving favorable terms on other aspects of the
agreement. Some countries impose a maximum time period during
which a license may remain in effect. The term of a license can be a
basis for setting the payment level. A five-year licensee may justifiably
pay royalties at a rate different from that of a ten-year licensee. These
are examples of recipient country regulations which render the most
favored licensee clause particularly unacceptable to transnationals
transferring technology into the developing countries.
The essence of the deficiencies of most favored licensee clauses
is the nature of the transfer negotiation proeess itself. Each license is
ideally the product of individual negotiations, and, unless exactly the
same, no two licenses can be compared to determine which one has
more favorable terms. To reduce transfer agreements to simplistic
terms for purposes of comparative valuation would destroy the unique
nuances and intricacies inherent in every agreement arrived at through
a process 6f negotiation.
D. Other Issues Raised by the Proposed Codes of Conduct
While the foregoing analysis has been confined to the chapters
of the proposed codes which address restrictive business practices and
guarantees in the technology transfer process, several more general
issues emerge from other chapters of the proposed codes which are
likely to generate considerable discussion and controversy. Therefore,
it would be useful to summarize briefly the most significant of these
issues, for they will establish the overall context from which a code
of conduct on the transfer of technology will emerge.
1. The Nature and Scope of the Code.
As previously indicated,9' the Group B and Group D countries have
taken the position that any code of conduct should be voluntary and
not legally binding. -92 Both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes envisage
a multilateral international accord, binding on its signatories. 3
Inextricably related to the determination of the mandatory/volun-
tary, legal/nonlegal nature of the code is the issue of its coverage or
scope of application. Again, the difference in approach between the
91. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
92. See Group B Code, ch. VIII, para. 8.2.
93. See Pugwash Code, ch. X, para. 15; Group 77, Preamble. See generally, U.N.
Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in
the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doe. E/C.10/17 at 5-9 (1976) for a
discussion of the nature of a general code of conduct.
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Pugwash and Group 77 Codes, on the one hand, and the Group B Code
on the other, is striking. The Pugwash Code, after broadly defining
the term "technology transfer," 4 provides that the code will "[aipply
to all transactions covering the transfer of technology regardless of
the parties involved whether private capital, state or regional or inter-'
national institutions."0' 5 The Group 77 Code employs similarly sweeping
language in describing the scope of the Code's application, and goes
beyond the Pugwash provision by explicitly providing that the Code
"[s]hall be universally applicable to all States ... ."0 Vredictably, the
Group B Code contains a much narrower definition of the term "inter-
national 'transfer of technology," 7 and provides that the guidelines
are "addressed" only to "parties" to a technology transfer transaction,
i.e.,'the source and recipient enterprises 8 and their governments. The
difference in meaning between "apply" and "applicable" as used in
the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes and "addressed" used in the Group
B Code is significant. The former intend the Code to be legally binding
while the latter intends the Code to be advisory or exhortatory in
nature.
The resolution of these disparate positions on the nature and scope
of a code of conduct underpins the entire discussion of a code of con-
duct on the transfer of technology, and will significantly flavor the
language, prohibitions, and guarantees to be included in the final ver-
sion of such a code. It is here that the debates between the developed
and developing countries will be most intense. For these reasons, the
Group of 77 could well abort the entire effort by adamantly insisting
on a universally applicable code, binding sovereign states and private
parties alike. The Group B governments will not countenance such an
agreement, and they will further point out that the Pugwash and
Group 77 proposals totally fail to recognize the actual limits on the
ability of the government of a developed country to regulate its private
enterprises.
2. Special Treatment of Developing Countries.
All three codes agree that some provision should be made for
special treatment of the developing countries.00 As with the scope of
94. Pugwash Code, ch. II, para. 2.
95. Id. ch. II, para. 3.
96. Group 77 Code, ch. II, para. 2.2.
97. Group B Code, ch. II, paras. 2.4-2.5.
98. Group B Code, ch. II, paras. 2.1-2.3 and 2.7.
99. Pugwash Code, ch. IX; Group B Code, ch. VI, paras. 6.2 & 6.3; Group 77 Code,,
oh. VI.
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the code, the nub of contention here is that both the Pugwash and
Group 77 Codes -purport to impose obligations on developed country
governments to take certain steps, e.g., grant preferential tax treatment
and develop local R&D capacity. Insisting on the imposition of such
obligations on developed country governments would significantly less-
en the possibility of attaining an agreement on any code of conduct.
The developing countries should exhibit the same kind of sensitivity
to encroachments on the sovereignty and autonomy of developed coun-
try governments as they do to like encroachments by the transnationals
on. their own sovereignty.
3. Applicable Law in Technology Transfer Agreements.
Both the Pugwash and Group 77 Codes provide that the jurisdiction
and interpretation of technology transfer agreements shall rest with
the technology-receiving country.'00 The Group B Code provides that
the parties should be free to negotiate the applicable law and in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the law of the
State which has the most significant relationship to the parties and
the transaction should govern.' 0' Since all three codes would permit
arbitration by procedures specified by the parties, the applicable law
provisions of the three codes appear sufficiently flexible to arrive at
a meaningful compromise.102
4. Collective Bargaining.
While the term "collective bargaining" does not appear as such
in any of the three proposed codes, the concept entered into the dis-
cussion of a code of conduct on international transfer of technology at
the Fourth Session of UNCTAD held in Nairobi in May 1976. There
are, however, certain provisions in the Group 77 Code which can be
viewed as antecedents of the concept that surfaced at the Nairobi
meeting. Specifically, the Group 77 Code includes a provision which
requires developed country governments to extend or strengthen
"[A]ssistance for the establishnent of national, regional and/or in-
ternational institutions, including technology transfer centres, to help
the developing countries to obtain their technological requirements
100. Pugwash Code, ch. VII, para. 12(i) & (ii); Group 77 Code, ch. VIII, paras.
8.1-8.2.
101. Group B Code, ch. VII, paras. 7.1-7.3.
102. Pugwash Code, ch. VII. para. 12(iii) & (iv); Group 77 Code, clb. VIII, para.
8.3; Group B Code, ch. VII, para. 7.4. Both the Pugwash and Group 77 Code would
permit recourse to arbitration only where the applicable law does not preclude the sane.
The Group B Code also urges the use of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. Id. ch. VII, par. 7.5(i).
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for the establishment, construction and operation of plants under the
most favorable terms and conditions."'103
The notion of collective bargaining, i.e., joint planning and nego-
tiation by developing countries with respect to the transnational tech-
nology supplier, was explicitly endorsed by the Fourth Session of
UNCTAD as a means of enhancing the bargaining position of develop-
ing country technology recipients. 10 4 While the concept of collective
bargaining among sovereign states has been explored in other con-
texts, 10 5 e.g., commodity producers and consumers, 'it is a novelty in
the technology transfer area. Because the UNCTAD resolution en-
dorsing collective bargaining by the developing countries was couched
in very general and abstract terms, meaningful discussion and analysis
of this concept must await a more specific elaboration of how the
principle of collective bargaining will operate in the technology transfer
area.
Suffice it to say that should the collective bargaining tactic which is
now being advocated by the developing countries lead to the legiti-
mization of cartel activities under the guise of collective bargaining,
the developed countries will strongly resist such a development. On
the other hand, should the operational content of the collective bar-
gaining concept indicate a good faith effort by the developing countries
to promote the ideal situation of an "arm's length" negotiation between
two evenly matched parties, the developed countries would likely be
receptive to such an approach.
I. CONCLUSION
Individual negotiation and compromise are paramount values of
any system affecting technology transfer agreements. These values
should be preserved and encouraged, and throughout this analysis of
clauses which might be prohibited, permitted, or required by a code
of conduct, those have been key goals.
Any code of conduct promulgated and sponsored by UNCTAD
in the future should strive to favor neither the transnational supplier
103. Group 77 Code, ch. VI, para. 6.1(vi). The Group 77 Code contains one other
provision which adverts to the idea of collective bargaining on a regional basis. Id. oh.
VII, para. 7.2.
104. UNCTAD Resolution 87(IV), U.N. Doc. TD/RES/87 (IV) at 3 (1970).
105. See, e.g., Hager, Commodity Agreements and the Developing Countries: - A
Collective Bargaining Approach, 7 INT. LAw. 309 (1973); T. Franeck and E. Chosler,
"At Arms' Length": The Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in International Relations
Between Equilibriated States, 15 VA. J. OF INT'L. LAw 579 (1975).
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nor developing country recipient viewpoint, but rather the ideal of
arm's-length negotiation between a commodity seller mad a commodity
buyer of comparable bargaining strengths. Ultimately, the transfer of
technology into developing countries will prosper where individualized
negotiations can be as effectively conducted as technology exchange
between transnationals themselves now prospers.
Code provisions should effectively improve the developing country
enterprises' bargaining positions, while retaining sufficient flexibility
for meaningful negotiation. By preserving flexibility and recognizing
those instances in whibh prohibitions and requirements may too se-
verely restrain the transnationals at the bargaining table, a considered
code of conduct can be a source of optimism for a new relationship
between transnational teclmology owners and developing country re-
cipients based on fair and hard negotiation of individually and socially
desirable technology transfer agreements.
Finally, the movement toward an international code of conduct on
the transfer of technology is but a reflection of larger, exceedingly
complex political problems which have been engendered by an inter-
national society undergoing profound changes. Demands for a new
international economic order, °u international regulation of transna-
tional enterprises'07 and the like' 08 form the backdrop for UNCTAD's
activities in the technology transfer area. These broader demands raise
the possibility that the work now being carried on by UNCTAD in
moving toward a code of conduct for the transfer of technology will
be subsumed by the development of a more comprehensive code of
conduct for transnational enterprises by the U.N. Commission on
Transnational Corporations.0a-
106. The Group 77 Code draws attention to the Resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly calling for a new international economic order. Group 77 Code, Preamble
(xv) & (xvi). See generally Zaphiriou, The U.N. Econonic Charter and U.S. Investment
Policy, 27 MERCER L. REv. 749 (1976).
107. See generally Wang, The Design of an International Code of Conduct for Trans-
national Corporations, 10 J. OF INT'L. L.W & Ecox. 319 (1975). Watson, jurisdiction
and Control over the Multinational Enterprise: De Maximis Non Curat Lex, 27 Mmcmt
L. RF-v. 493 (1976).
108. An interesting analysis of the political coining of age of tie developing countries,
the reasons therefor, and a suggested response by the U.S. is found in Senator Moynihan's
recent article The United States in Opposition, COMMENTARY, March 1975 at 31.
109. See The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and
on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500 Rec. 1 (1974). See also Transnathanal
Corporations: Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/17 (1976). Given the practical difficulties of arranging the multilateral nego-
tiation and approval of two separate, but overlapping codes of conduct, the incorporation
of UNCTAD's work on technology transfer into the comprehensive code on transnational
enterprises appears to be a likely occurrence in the near future.
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Whether or not a code of conduct on the transfer of technology
eventually becomes a reality, the discussion and interchange between
the developed and developing countries which the concept itself has
brought about has value in itself. Given the central role of the trans-
nationals in this controversy, the suggestion that they are indeed
engines of world peace - insofar as their activities present problems
which require solutions involving cooperative action between the
developed and developing world - acquires a certain validity.
In the realities of today's world it would seem that before any
code of conduct can come into practical effect there will have to be
at least a partial voluntary adoption and approval of its terms by both
the transnationals and their home governments. 'Before this can occur
there will have to be much give and take on the part of both the
transnationals and the developing countries.
The initial efforts to draft codes favorable to the developing coun-
tries, as represented by the Pugwash and Group 77 proposals, are too
inflexible and go beyond anything that the transnationals would be
willing to voluntarily accept. A meaningful, workable, practical, and
flexible code will require large doses of compromise on both sides.
Accustomed as the transnationals are to operating in an environment
where external restraints, such as antitrust laws, are imposed, they
should be willing to agree to some form of code containing voluntary
provisions, as well as some legally binding provisions. The acceptability
of such a compromise would be particularly viable if the legally bind-
ing prohibitions were directed against restrictive provisions that have
been generally recognized as illegal under United States, EEC, and
Japanese antitrust principles, such as price fixing and tie-out provisions.
It is interesting to observe that since Pugwash was first put forward,
the Group B countries have moved from outright opposition to any
form of code regulating international technology transfer to their own
proposal, the Group B Code. The dialogue has thus begun. Where it
will lead is unpredictable, but its future path and eventual outcome
will be stimulating to follow.
The resolution of the debate over the code is unquestionably one
of the most vital components needed to bring about a resolution of
the broader North-South conflict, and the peaceful resolution of that
conflict is the most important issue facing the world today.
